Allocative inefficiency and local government: evidence rejecting the Tiebout hypothesis by Lori L. Taylor




Allocative Inefficiencyand Local Government:
Evidence Rejectingthe Tiebout Hypothesis
by
Lori L. Taylor, Research Department
FederalReserve Bankof Dallas
June 1993
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) Allocative  Inefliciency  and l,ocal Governmentl
Evidence  Rejecting  the Tiebout Hypothesis
I-ori L. Taylor, Research  Department
Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dalias
The views  expressed  in this article are solely  those  of the authors  and should  not be
attributed to the Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dallas or to the Federal  Reserve  System.Allocative  Inefficiency  and  Local  Governmeqt:
Evidence  Rejectjng  tlie  Tiebout  Hypothesis-
Lori L. Tayl  or
revj  sed  May  1993
"  I would  like to thank  Katherine  Bradbury,  Stephen  P.A.  Brown  and
Carolyn  Sherwood-Call  for their insightful comments  and  Steven  Prue,  David
Hanna  and  Jim  Hedges  for thejr research  assjstance,  0f course,  the usual
di  scl  aimer  appl  ies.Charles  Tiebout  (1956)  hypothesized  that the tendency  of potential
residents  to "vote  vlith  their feet" creates  market-l  ike incentives  for
efficient governnent.  His intriguing  proposition  spawned  numerous  economic
studies  that tested  for efficiency  in government  decision-making  (see,  for
example  0ates  1969). One  attractjve line of research  relies on  hedonjc
estjmation  of the relationship  between  property  values  and  the complete  nix of
taxes  and  government  services. Jan  Brueckner  (1979,  1982)  demonstrated  that
the partial derivatives  of such  a hedonic  function  with respect  to the
provision  of public  goods  can  yield the Samuelson  conditions  for efficjent
allocation  of a publ  ic good.
Tests  for allocative  efficiency  using  Brueckner's  approach  have  yielded
mjxed  results.  using  data  on  communities  in New  Jersey,  Brueckner  (1979)
found  evidence  that public servjces  are systematically  over-provided.
However,  in a subsequent  study  using  data  on  communities  in lt4assachusetts  and
following  a chain  of reasoning  he  considered  simpler  and  nore  reliable,
Brueckner  found  no  evidence  of systematic  under-  or over-provision  of public
services  and  therefore  could  not reject the Tiebout  hypothesis.l  Steven
Deller (1990b)  also  could  not reject the hypothesi  s using  data  on  communities
in Maine. However,  when  Deller (1990a)  attempted  to internal  ize the possible
spillover  of benefits  between  smaller  jurisdictions  by  analyzing  counties  jn
Ill inois, he  found  evidence  that governments  under-provide  highway  and  pol  ice
serv'ices.
This  paper  rnodifies  Brueckner's  approach  and  applies  it  to data  on
communities  jn the Hartford,  Connecticut  Metropolitan  Stati  stical Area  (l4SA).
The  focus  on  a single  labor  market  avoids  problems  of interpretation  that
1  Brueckner,  1982  pp. 329.night arise in analyses  across  labor  markets  from  the interactjon  between
property  values  and  wages  (see  Roback  1982). The  cross-sectjonal  analysis
relies on spatial auto-correlation  techniques  to control  for any  benefit
spillovers  among  the coterminous  jurisdictions.  Furthermore,  the analysis
incorporates  more  information  about  communjty  services  than  was  available  in
Drevi  ous  studies.
The  estimation  reveals  evidence  of systematjc  resource  mjs-allocation.
In particul  ar, communities  in the Hartford  MSA  appear  to have  allocated
relatively too few  resources  to highways  and  education.
The  Theory
Fo1  iowing  Brueckner,  assume  that consumers  have  identical  tastes  toward
public  aoods  (zr ....zn),  housing  services  (q) and  a numeraire  private  good
(x).  Assume  further that, because  indivjduals  are  mobjle,  in equilibrium  all
consumers  with the same  level of income  can  achieve  the same  leve'l  of utility
(u).  Therefore,  utility  can  be  expressed  as a function  of income  (y).
u(2r,.,,  zn, e,  x) =u=f(y). (r)
The  consumer's  budget  constrai  nt
Y=tuMc+R+x (2)
reflects the fact that rental payments  (R)  entitle consumers  to given  1eve1  s
of housing  services  and  public  goods,  and  that consuners  pay  taxes  (rn) ontheir stock  of mobile  personal  property  (M.).2 For  tractabil  ity,  assume  that
in equilibrium  the consumer's  new  purchases  of mobile  personal  property  just
offset depreciation  of the property  stock  so  that the mobile  property  tax
payments  (tnM.  ) are fixed,
It  follows  from  the consumer's  budget  constraint  that R  must  satisfy
u(2.,.,..zn,q,y  -  R -  rr{Mc)  = h(y)  . (3)
Equatjon  3 impljcjtly deternines  the consumer  bid-rent  function
3  = R(21. ,,..Zn,e;y  -  !J{c) , (4)
which  indicates  that the house  rent that is consistent  with the assumed
utility  level u is a function  of the level of public  goods  provided,  housing
servi  ces, and  disposable  income.
Because  in equilibrium  the jndivjdual  must  be indifferent between  owning
and  renting, the sales  price of a house  (S) represents  the present  discounted
value  of the after-tax stream  of rental benefits.3 Let r,  be  the tax rate
for real estate  and  0 represent  the discounting  factor,  Assuming  that real
estate  is an  infinitely  lived asset,  the sale  price of a hone  would  be
'  Mobile  personal  property  is not consjdered  in the original Brueckner
model  , but the characteristics  of communities  jn the Hartford  MSA  make  it  a
necessary  consideration  here.  In nany  cases,  more  than  one  third of alI
property  tax revenues  come  from  the taxation  of property  (such  as  cars  and
boats)  that is not real es!a!e.




Therefore,  the aggregate  value  of residential  property
with h housing  units would  be
(5)
in a commun  i ty
(6)
government  nust fjnance  the publ'ic
grants  and  net borrowing.
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'  It(2,. zn, Qiiy  t 
-  rMMci) -rRPr
0n  the other  sjde  of the picture, the
goods  using  tax revenues,  i  n  tergovernmenta  I
Balancing  the budget  requires  that
rP  + -P'R cj (zj,v) (7)
v'rhere  Cj(2,,v) is the cost of producjng  z un'its  of public  good  j  given  a
population  v and  G  is government  revenues  from  all  sources  excluding  taxes  on
residential  real estate.  The  popul  ation factor in the cost functjon  allows
for poss  ibl  e congesti  on.
Substituting  the balanced-budget  equation  into equation  6 yields
Ri  +G  - c,  (zr,v)J  , (8)
c=\- -ZJ
n
t ".  =t,E
i  ndi  cati  ng  that res'idential
di  scounted  sum  of aggregate
real estate  val  ues  in
res  i  denti  al rents  and
a community  are  the
revenues  from  all  sourcesother  than  taxes  on  resjdential  real estate, less the cost of producing  the n
publ  i  c goods  .
Brueckner  (1982)  demonstrates  that djfferentiating equation  (8) with
respect  to the levels of publjc  goods  provided  yields the Samuelson
conditions  for optimal  provision  of public  goods,  assuming  that the public
goods  do not enter  the firms' production  functions. Therefore,  communities
behave  in a Pareto-efficient  manner  if  the partial derivatjve  of residential
real estate  values  wjth respect  to the provision  of public  goods  is zero  for
alI of the public  goods  provided. Assuming  that the communities  in the sample
are sufficiently similar that most  share  a common  tendency  to under-provide,
over-provide,  or optimal  1y provide  certain  public  goods,  estinating  the
property  values  hedonic  specified  in equation  (8) yields estirnates  of these
parti  a1  derivati  ves.
The  Data
Data  for this analysis  of the communities  surrounding  Hartford,
Connectjcut  come  from  the 1980  Census  of Housing  and  Population,  the 1977
Census  of Governments  and  Connecticut's  Eoual  ized  Net  Grand  List for 1980.
The  Equaljzed  Net  Grand  List, which  js compiled  from  the state's annual  study
of sales  and  assessments,  presents  estimates  of the value  of resjdential  and
commercial  real estate  and  other  personal  property  in each  town.
The  census  of housing  and  popul  ation indicates  the number  of rooms  in
the median  hone  (MEDR0OMS),  the age  of the housing  stock  (STRUC39,  the
proporti0n  of homes  constructed  before  1939),  the proportion  of hous'ing  units
with ajr conditioning  (AIR)  , the number  of housing  units in the jurisdiction
(H0USING)  and  the percentage  of those  units that are unoccupied  (VACANTRT),the total land  area  jn the jurjsdiction (LANDAREA),  the total population  in
the jurisdiction (P0P80),  and  the per capita  jncome  of the population.
The  census  of governments  indicates  the extent  of local government
revenues  from  property  taxes and  other sources,  and  the extent of comnunity
indebtedness  as  a share  of local revenues  (NETASSET).4  The  census  of
governments  also indicates  the extent  of local government  expenditures  on
education  (LOCLSCHL),  pol  ice and  fire  protection  (SAFETY),  health,  hospital
and  welfare  services  (H&t^IELFARE),  highway  repair and  constructjon  (HIGHWAY),
and  any  other  expenditures  (0THEREXP),  Any  user  fees  or transfers  from  other
'loca1  governments  are subtracted  fr"om  each  of the expendjtures  variables  as
payments  for  servi  ces rendered.
The  Equal  ized  Net  Grand  List provides  information  on  the value  of
residential  real estate  in the jurisdiction (RESVALUE),  the values  of non-
residential  real estate  and  taxable  mobile  property,  and  the corresponding
effective tax rates.  All  values  are adjusted  for differences  in assessment
across  jurisdictjons.  From  this information  and  information  fron the censuses
of housing  and  government,  I construct  estimates  of the share  of commercial
property  in the jurisdiction (COMMERCE),  local government  revenues  exc'l  uding
taxes  on  residential  real estate  (REVENUES)  and  per household  income  net of
personal  property  taxes  (HINCOME).
A map  of Connectjcut  indicates  the distance  between  each  community  and
every  other community,  and  between  each  community  and  the center of Hartford
city  (DISTANCE).
"  The  other  sources  include  taxes  on  business  real estate  and  mobile
property,  local licensing  fees, i  nterg  overnment  al grants  and  net borrowing.
l,,ljth  the exception  of Hartford  Cjty, the municipal  ities in the Hartford  l'lSA
did not use  sales  or income  taxes  to finance  local qovernment  activities.After obvious  outliers were  removed,  complete  data  are available  for 79
communities  in the Hartford  MSA.  Because  its  sheer  size, urban  nature  and  use
of sales  taxes  make  it  an  atypical  community  in the MSA,  Hartford  Cjty has
been  excluded  from  the analysis. Table  I reports  descriptive  statjstics for
the variables  used  in this analvsis.
The  Esti  mati  on
Five  econometrjc  problems  arjse in the estimation  of equation  (8).
First, the avajlable  data  provide  information  on  community  expenditures  on
public services,  but not on  the Ievels  of service  provjded. However,  by
i  nverti  ng  the cost functjons
Ej  = Cj (zj,v) (e)
one  can  express  the levels of service  provided  as
z, =  e,  (er,  v  ) (  l0)
where  E, is the level of expenditures  on  public  good  or servjce  i.  Inverting
the cost functions  is unappeal  ing because  it  implies  that all  junisdictions
are equal  ly efficient  (or inefficient) at transforning  money  into services.
Holrever,  it  is a necessary  evil that has  been  used  in the previous  hedonjc
appl  ications  of Brueckner's  theoretical  model  .  Therefore,  it  is the approach
taken  here.
Second,  the est'imation  is vulnerable  to problems  of heteroskedasticity
and  multicoll  inearity.  Exploratory  Breusch-Pagan  tests indicated  that the
error variance  increased  with P0P80,  HOUSING  and  total expenditures.Furthermore,  many  of the regressors  are interrelated.  For  example,  public
goods  expenditures  jn the communities  are  highly  correlated  with each  other
and  with population  and  housing. Such  multicoll  inearity llould  affect
estimates  of standard  errors and  could  lead  to unwarranted  acceptance  of the
Tiebout  hypothes  i  s,
Fortunately,  both  of these  estimation  problems  could  be  addressed
sinultaneously.  Dividing  all  of the variables  by  the square  root of total
expenditures  reduces  the Breusch-Pagan  test statjstic below  the critical  value
for heteroskedasticity  and  substantially  reduces  the correlations  among  the
regressors. For  example,  the Pearson  correlation  coeffjcient for the
relationship  between  LOCLSCHL  and  HIGHI{AY  decl  ines  from  .7923  to .5257.
Therefore,  this approach  has  been  followed  for this analysis.
Third, there  may  be  benefit  spillovers  between  jurisdictions that could
introduce  spatjal autocomelation.  However,  the spillover of benefits  between
jurisdictions should  be  a functjon  of the distance  between  them. After all,
it  seems  reasonable  that communjties  are  more  likely to benefit  from  thejr
neighbor's  expenditures  on  po1  ice and  fire  protection  than  from  the po1  ice and
fire  expenditures  of a jurisdiction on  the other  side  of the MSA.  Therefore,
techniques  deveioped  by Robin  Dubin  (1988)  are used  to test and  correct  for
the presence  of spatial autocorrelation  in the data.5
Fourth,  a jurisdiction's mix  of services  and  taxes  may  be  an  endogenous
function  of community  characteri  stics such  as income.  Ideal  1y, one  would  want
to develop  a two  stage  model  wherein  expenditures  and  nonresidential  revenues
where  determined  prior to property  values. However,  there is not enough
'  For  a conplete  explanation  of the technique,  whjch  reljes on  the
assumption  that the spatial autocorrelation  between  two  points  is a negatjve
exponential  function  of the djstance  between  them.  see  Dubin.information  to separately  identify the five types  of expenditures  and  the
REVENUES  variable, and  consjderable  information  vlould  be  lost through
aggregation.  Furthermore,  the spatial autocorrelation  techniques  do  not
easily  generalize  to multi-stage  estimation. Final  1y, the expenditures  and
revenues  data (which  come  from  the 1977  Census  of Governments)  were  gathered
prior to the data  on  property  values,  incomes  and  housing  characte[i  stics
(which  come  from  the 1980  Census  of Housing  and  Popu.l  atjon and  the 1980  Net
Grand  List).  Therefore,  it  seems  reasonable  to treat the expenditures  and
revenues  vari  abl  es as  exogenous.
The  fjnal econometric  problem  arjses  because  econonic  theory  provides
little  guidance  about  the functional  forms  for the consumer's  bid-rent
functjon  and  the inverse  cost functions  for the public  goods. Therefore,  I
estimate  equation  (8) in partially reduced  form
e = 
f  fr(e.,...e,..v,qrh,y-rMM)  +c (ll)
where  €j is expenditures  per capita  on  public  good  (or service)  j  and  f(.)  can
be  either a Iinear  or a ioqarithmic  function.6
Resul  ts
As  Table  2 jndicates,  communjties  jn the Hartford  MSA  apparently  did not
in a Pareto-efficient  nanner  during  the peniod  under  study.  Regardless
the form  of the f(.)  function,  the joint hypothesis  that the coefficient on





u  Because  NETASSET
transformed  when  the f(.)
takes  on  both  positive  and  negative  values,  it  js not
function  is estimated  using  natural  logs.
9of significance./ In particular, the data  suggest  that communities  in the
Hartford  MSA  could  increase  property  va1  ues  by raisjng taxes  on  residential
property  (the  only element  of the budget  not held  constant  in the estimation)
and  using  the proceeds  to increase  spending  on  education  or highways.
It  is jnteresting  to note  that no  government  service  appears  to have
been  systematically  over-provided.  Therefore,  the data  support  the notjon
that residents  have  a taste for all  types  of government  services  -- including
transfer  payments  such  as health  and  welfare  services  -- and  are  willing to
tax themsel  ves accord  i  ng  ly  .
The  analysis  a1  so  provides  some  evidence  that benefit spillovers  between
jurisdictions are inconsequential  .  When  a linear functional  form  is used  to
estimate  f(.),  a likelihood  ratio test detects  spatial autocorrelation  that is
significant at the 5 percent  level  , but correcting  for the spatial
autocoffelatjon  has  no  qual'itative  effect on  the results (see  Table  2).  When
a logarjthmic  functional  form  js used  to estimate  f('),  a I ikelihood  ratio
test fails  to detect  any  spatial autocorrel  at  ion,  l,lhile  jt  may  imply  only
that the spatial autocorrelation  takes  on  a different fr"om  than  assumed  in the
analysis,  thjs result is consistent  with Dubin's  analysis  of housing  values  jn
whjch  she  found  that spatial autocorrelation  decayed  in less than  2 miles.
The  communities  under  study  here  are  general  1y  more  separate  than  that.
Compari  sons  with Previous  Analyses
The  impl  ication  that publjc  services  are systematically  under-provided
'  The  F-Statistics  for the joint  hypothesis  are  7.07  and  6.31  (with 5
and  5l degrees  of freedom)  for the linear and  logarithmic  functional  forms,
respectively. The  Likelihood  Ratio  for the l inear  functional  form  with
spatial autocorrelation  (which  is distrjbuted  as  a chi-square  random  variable
with 5 degrees  of freedom)  is 78.02.
10jn the Hartford  MSA  is inconsjstent  with most  of the prev'ious  appl  ications  of
Brueckner's  theoretical  model  .  Three  factors  may  explain  those
inconsistencjes.  First, the communities  analyzed  here  come  from  a single
labor  market  whjle the previous  analyses  have  included  communities  from
mult'ip1e  labor  markets  within a single  state.  Because  djfferences  in
amenities  such  as public servjces  can  be  capitaljzed  into wages  as  well as
property  va1  ues  (see  Roback,  1982),  including  more  than  one  I  abor  narket  jn
the previous  studies  may  have  biased  the estimates  of the relationshjp  between
property  values  and  public services,  and  will  have  muddled  the interpretation
of their results.s Therefore,  inconsistencies  between  this study  and  previous
studies  may  reflect specification  errors jn the earl  ier work.
Second,  this analysis  has  been  simpl  ified to use  aggregate  resjdentjal
property  values  as  the dependent  varjable  rather  than  aggregate  total property
values  as in most  of the previous  applications  (Brueckner  1982,  Deller 1990a,
1990b), Because  business  property  values  are independent  of government
services  (by assumption),  the coefficients  on  government  services  and  the
implications  for the Tiebout  hypothesis  should  be  unaffected  by the choice  of
dependent  variable.  However,  including  business  property  in the dependent
variable  adds  noise  to the estimation  that might  affect the coefficient
estimates  in small  samples.  Furthermore,  any  variable  used  to control for
variations  in business  property  values  (such  as  the number  of firms)
unnecessarily  reduces  the degrees  of freedom.
The  third factor that may  explain  differences  between  this study  and
previous  studies  is the treatment  of mobile  personal  property. Although  there
8 In particular, if  some
capital  ized into wages,  then
Samuel  son  conditions  for the
of the benefjts  of government  services  are
maximizing  property  values  need  not lead  to the
efficient allocation  of publ  ic goods.
1Ijs no  reason  to bel  ieve  that local amenities  are  capital  jzed into the value  of
mobile  property  like boats  or cars, the differences  between  real estate  and
personal  property  are  not addressed  in the previous  analyses.  Adjusting  the
analysis  to acconmodate  the distjnction Ieads  this study  to use  different
measures  of the dependent  variable,  household  income,  and  Iocal government
revenues  net of property  taxes.  Some  of the differences  between  thjs analysis
and  previous  analyses  rnay  result from  those  refinements  in the choice  of
vari  abl  es.
Goncl  us  i  ons
This  analysjs  suggests  that, given  the existing  housing  stock,
governments  in the Hartford,  Connecticut  MSA  did not act efficiently during
the latter part of the 1970s. In particul  ar, the estirnatjon  jndicates  that
real estate  values  in the |'|SA  could  have  been  increased  by increasing  taxes  0n
residential  real estate  and  using  the proceeds  to provide  more  education  and
highway  services. The  governments'  systematic  inefficjencies  may  reflect the
problems  of planning  in an  uncertain  inflationary  environment,  rather  than  an
outright rejection  of the Tiebout  hypothesis,  but this piece  of evjdence  also
casts  some  doubt  on  the short-term  jmpact  of voting  with your  feet.
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Model  A = f  (.)
Model  B  = f(.)
Model  C  = f(.)
functi  on  I  inear.
function  Iinear; corrected  for spatjal autocorrelation.
functi  on  I  ogari  thmi  c.
Standard  errors are in parentheses.  An  asterisk  indjcates  that the variable
is significantly different from  zero  at the 5 percent  level  .
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